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INTRODUCTION
In December 2013, Chinese government announced a new regulation on formula milk powder production, which has imposed 
more restrictions on “combined process” and “wet-mix process”. This policy change leads to an inevitable need for upgrading the 
production technology in the near future [1].
Moreover, total global milk production in 2013 was lower than in 2012 due to the drought in New Zealand (14% lower), the 
mediocre quality of the available roughage in EU (2% lower), and bad weather conditions in Australia (8% lower) and Argentina 
(7% lower). As a result of this supply side shock, sales prices remained high during the second half of 2013. On the demand side, 
particularly the demand for milk powder in the world market remained exceptionally high due to the high demand from China 
and Russia. During the second half of 2013 China imported 25% more dairy products (mainly milk powders and infant nutrition) 
than during the comparable period in 2012. This meant total imports of around 4.5 billion kilos of milk equivalents. In the same 
period Russia imported around 173,000 tons of cheese and 52,000 tons of butter—10% more than in 2012. The new food safety 
legislation in China was also embedded in the internal quality programmes, exacerbating the gap between supply of and demand 
for high quality milk powder products.
As a leading Dutch dairy producer, FrieslandCampina (It has a premium brand in infant milk powder, Friso, gaining fast 
popularity in China after a confusion regarding the origin of various brands in 2013) has a mature supply chain of milk powder 
products and other dairy products in the whole world including China. It makes FrieslandCampina a good international counterpart 
of the decision maker’s company. Note that both chosen cases, YILI and FrieslandCampina [2], are well-established milk powder 
producers, which are comparable to the decision-maker’s company. Therefore, the fluctuations in both profitability and returns 
are not subject to transition effects such as initial increasing return to scales/scopes. The decisions of whether expanding the 
investment or keeping status quo are mainly driven by the market factors and their expectations of these factors. The following 
sections are applying the two indicators to explain the investment activities of FrieslandCampina in the recent five years, so as to 
inform the decision making on whether an expansion in milk powder production is financially favourable [3].
To analyse the financial feasibility of the investment project (i.e., building a new milk powder factory), cost is obviously the 
most important information for decision making. However, the profit and assets will also be affected by the investment, so a 
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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the feasibility of investing 
in a new milk powder factory, based on a case study of leading domestic 
producers in China and Netherlands. A key issue is the cost of the 
project, but a high cost does not mean it is not economically feasible, 
nor does a low cost guarantee the investment. Instead, systematic 
indicators should be used to associate the cost with profitability, returns 
to assets and corporate strategy.
Limitations: It is worth noting that the case study here is based on 
the latest financial reports of the companies, so the conclusions might 
be subject to the special conditions of the particular company in the 
particular year. Therefore, wherever possible, all recent financial reports 
available are used to provide robustness check. Another limitation of 
this case study is that there is no way to extract more detailed cost 
information other than that disclosed in the published financial reports. 
To obtain an absolute estimate for the costs of building the factory, 
private information should be exploited elsewhere.
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comprehensive financial analysis should take into account the implications of the cost as well as the cost per se. In addition, 
the strategic considerations also play a vital role-even if the investment seems financially infeasible in the short run, it may be 
strategically justifiable to compete with the competitors in the long run (Table 1).
Table 1. Profitability and return indicators of the dutch producer (in million euro).
Overall 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Assets 4770 5299 5739 6838 7112
Equity 1749 2071 2264 2258 2631
Total Revenue 8187 8992 9646 10324 11441
Net Income 182 285 216 278 157
Profit Margin 2.22% 3.17% 2.24% 2.69% 1.37%
Investment 236 261 376 423 559
ROA 3.82% 5.38% 3.76% 4.07% 2.21%
ROE 10.41% 13.76% 9.54% 12.31% 5.97%
Investment Share 4.95% 4.93% 6.55% 6.19% 7.86%
Milk Powder 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Assets 919 1063 2190 2445 3017
Equity 670 650 1516 1601 2078
Total Revenue 1507 2063 4752 4854 5784
Net Income -20 99 208 196 329
Profit Margin -1.33% 4.80% 4.38% 4.04% 5.69%
Investment 111 126 160 237 310
ROA -2.18% 9.31% 9.50% 8.02% 10.90%
ROE -2.99% 15.23% 13.72% 12.24% 15.83%
Investment Share 12.08% 11.85% 7.31% 9.69% 10.28%
Asset Share 19.27% 20.06% 38.16% 35.76% 42.42%
Notes: The investments here are the addition to the assets, i.e., the formed capital stocks, which are different from (less than) the 
investment which also includes construction in process.
The following sections make use of the published financial reports of a leading domestic milk powder manufacturers to 
imply the cost effectiveness of the investment. The effectiveness is measured by two systematic indicators. First, compare the 
profit margin of the investment on the new factory with the average profit margin of the other products in the same company 
(to compare like-with-like). If it has a relatively higher profit margin, then the investment is cost effective; otherwise, it is not 
suggested to proceed with establishing a new factory (The first indicator is in line with the law of NPV) [4]. Second, compare the 
returns (e.g. ROA, ROE) of the investment on the new factory with the average returns of the other products in the same company. 
If it has a relatively higher return, then the company should consider increasing the investment; otherwise, it should keep the 
level unchanged (not suggest to disinvest considering the adjustment costs) (the second indicator is in line with the law of diminishing 
marginal product of capital). Note that the first indicator is particularly informative to outsiders—whether a company without such a 
factory should build one, while the second indicator is informative to insiders—whether and how a company with such a factory should 
increase its investment.
Profitability Indicator
YILI is one of the leading domestic producers of milk powder adopting wet-mix process method. In 2012, its total revenue on 
milk powder products is ¥4.484 billion and the profit margin is 39.49%. According to the first indicator (the blue bars in Figure 1), we 
can see a strong support for establishing the new factory given the outstanding financial performance of the new production technology.
Figure 1. The profitability of a typical wet-mix process factory.
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The detailed profit margin figures can be found in Table 2 of Appendix I. As shown in the graph and table, when the discrepancy 
in profit margin between different product lines emerged in 2009, YILI started to increase the investment in milk powder factory 
(through investment in DuErBoTe discussed below). Later on, the profit margin begins to fall and the profitability is more balanced 
across all projects within YILI, so it does not have further incentve to increase the investment. However, there is still a huge 
capacity of investing in the milk powder production for an outsider company which intends to build a new factory. Judging from the 
YILI case, milk powder seems to be able to generate the highest profit compared to the other dairy product lines.
Table 2. Profitability indicators of the chinese producers (Yuan).
Year Milk Powder Liquid Milk Milk Beverage Mixed Feed
Total Revenue
2008 3,232,876,375.32 16,330,882,427.48 1,728,947,726.83
2009 4,696,006,467.54 17,726,885,181.27 1,775,613,333.59
2010 4,622,668,736.81 20,984,870,187.92 3,544,219,331.90 393,441,756.01
2011 5,642,126,541.19 26,932,704,210.32 4,221,715,560.20 468,966,213.89
2012 4,484,401,126.62 32,270,730,892.65 4,294,349,387.46 686,642,590.15
Total Costs
2008 2,498,453,321.23 14,212,906,567.15 1,216,335,400.03
2009 3,113,585,419.88 14,972,704,246.33 1,371,916,984.88
2010 2,820,566,667.11 14,940,953,911.25 2,510,911,023.87 344,594,939.81
2011 3,239,060,279.48 19,788,449,537.53 2,963,179,913.26 404,897,033.66
2012 2,713,287,626.97 23,188,338,695.50 2,908,648,467.17 576,677,180.22
Net Income
2008 734,423,054.09 2,117,975,860.33 512,612,326.80
2009 1,582,421,047.66 2,754,180,934.94 403,696,348.71
2010 1,802,102,069.70 6,043,916,276.67 1,033,308,308.03 48,846,816.20
2011 2,403,066,261.71 7,144,254,672.79 1,258,535,646.94 64,069,180.23
2012 1,771,113,499.65 9,082,392,197.15 1,385,700,920.29 109,965,409.93
Gross Profit Margin
2008 22.72% 12.97% 29.65%
2009 33.70% 15.54% 22.74%
2010 38.98% 28.80% 29.15% 12.42%
2011 42.59% 26.53% 29.81% 13.66%
2012 39.49% 28.14% 32.27% 16.01%
As shown in Figure 2, the milk powder products made a loss in the year of 2009 (-1.33%), lower than the overall business 
(2.22%). Given this underperformance, the asset share (the green line) was kept low during 2009. From 2010 onwards, the milk 
powder has an exceptional outperformance compared to the other products, resulting in a growing asset share via dedicated 
investments. As the gap between milk powder and other products shrinks (e.g. 2012), the asset share (and the investment) of 
milk powder also drops a little bit. This significant positive correlation between profitability and investment is obviously followed 
by FrieslandCampina. This is another example (in addition to YILI case) showing when an expansion investment on milk powder 
should be taken. The decision maker is suggested to check the overall profit margin and compare it with that of the milk powder 
products. The detailed profit margin figures can be found in Table 2 of Appendix.
Figure 2. The profitability of milk powder products and all products.
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Return Indicator
According to the second indicator, the return on assets (ROA) can be used to inform the decision maker whether the 
investments on milk powder factory should be increased, and the return on equity (ROE) can be used to inform whether the 
investment should take the form of paid-in capital (equity) or debt (liability).
DuErBoTe is the largest subsidiary company specialising in milk powder production for YILI. Its total assets are ¥601,303,100 
in 2012, with an annual production capacity of 45,000 tons. The ROA and ROE of DuErBoTe are contrasted with the overall 
averages of YILI. Obviously, they are a bit lower than the average performance in the recent years. It implies that YILI should 
stop increasing the investment on milk powder production in 2011 (when the ROA of YILI overtakes that of DuErBoTe), which is 
consistent with the conclusion in the previous section’s conclusion [5]. The increasing investment in milk powder factories in 2008 
and 2009 by YILI is also justified by Figure 3 (Nevertheless, the low returns may be also partly due to the decline in sales of the 
milk powder products). The detailed ROA can be found in Table 3 of Appendix I.
Figure 3. Difference in ROA between YILI and DuErBoTe.
Table 3. Return indicators of the chinese producers (Yuan).
Year Level Assets Equity NI ROA ROE
2009 YILI 13,152,143,646.51 3,709,938,861.32 665,268,328.23 5.62% 19.92%
2009 DuErBoTe 417,586,379.86 292,310,465.90 33,831,897.72 8.10% 11.57%
2010 YILI 15,362,324,086.57 4,512,035,271.25 795,762,734.61 5.76% 19.60%
2010 DuErBoTe 469,398,747.62 328,579,123.33 38,443,775.56 8.19% 11.70%
2011 YILI 19,929,500,601.48 19,929,500,601.48 1,832,437,348.71 10.22% 10.22%
2011 DuErBoTe 494,122,944.93 361,798,949.56 41,961,655.58 8.49% 11.60%
2012 YILI 19,815,400,462.16 19,815,400,462.16 1,736,021,721.36 9.73% 9.73%
2012 DuErBoTe 601,303,100.00 394,809,900.00 33,011,000.00 5.49% 8.36%
According to Figure 4, the low ROE of the milk powder project indicates that YILI should keep the existing paid-in capital or 
increasing the asset through debt rather than equity. This is verified in YILI’s annual financial reports that its paid-in capital for 
DuErBoTe did not change over the last several years. The detailed ROE can also be found in Table 3 of Appendix I.
Figure 4. Difference in ROE between YILI and DuErBoTe.
The implication to the current project is that the company in stake needs to check its own ROA and ROE in contrast with 
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those of milk powder industry (DuErBoTe could be used as a proxy). If its overall ROA is relatively lower than that of milk powder 
industry, then a further investment is supported. In addition, ROE informs the capital structure of the project (Figures 5 and 6).
According to the second indicator, the return on assets (ROA) can be used to inform the decision maker whether the 
investments on milk powder factory should be increased, and the return on equity (ROE) can be used to inform whether the 
investment should take the form of paid-in capital (equity) or debt (liability).
Figure 5. Difference in ROA between milk powder products and all products.
Figure 6. Difference in ROE between milk powder products and all products.
Figures 3 and 4 show the relationships between investment and these two indicators. Again, the expansion of capital in milk 
powder manufacturing is positively correlated with the two return indicators. As the ROA/ROE of milk powder products are higher 
than those of the remaining products, investments are concentrated in milk powder production [6]. In particular, FrieslandCampina 
invested 559 million euro, aiming at the growing and the anticipated growing dairy products in 2013. Among others, infant 
nutrition (milk powder and ingredient) is the largest investment totalling 222 million euro (39.71% of all) (Table 4).
Table 4. The annual financial report lists of investment projects on infant nutrition products in 2013.
Location Investment Goal
Beilen €34 million expansion of production capacity for infant nutrition by installing new spray-drying tower, expansion of small packaging and improvement of infrastructure
Bedum €71 million expansion of milk processing capacity and production capacity for infant nutrition by installing new spray-drying tower and whey desalination
Borculo €54 million expansion of production capacity of ingredients for infant nutrition
Veghel €63 million
expansion of milk processing capacity and production capacity for infant nutrition by expanding 
the capacity for receiving and de-creaming raw milk, expansion of whey processing capacity and 
improvement of the efficiency of caseinate and lactose production
In addition to these investment projects in process, FrieslandCampina also approved of another two major projects starting 
in 2014, totaling 176 million euro shown below (Table 5).
Table 5. Major projects, totaling 176 million euro.
Location Investment Goal
Borculo €135 million expansion of production capacity by building a new production facility with spray-drying tower for milk powder and ingredients
Borculo €41 million
expansion of production capacity for infant nutrition
ingredients
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These investment expansions are mainly due to the prevailing and anticipated high demand growth in global milk powder 
market, especially in China (as described in the 2013 annual report, p31, p32, p38, p39, p42, p53, p66). 
Strategic Consideration
Apart from the two financial indicators, one should also take into account the long run strategic arrangement in the dairy 
market. Milk powder products in China are still in transition and the main players in this market are trying their best to seize 
market share. For example, MENGNIU did not invest much in milk formula business until it announced the largest acquisition 
(HK$11.4 billion) in China’s milk powder industry in 2013. This event makes YASHILI a subsidiary company (holding about 89.82% 
share) of MENGNIU and enables MENGNIU to capture swift growth opportunities in the domestic pediatric milk formula market [7].
In the international realm, milk powder market is now more like a monopolistic competition according to the HHI (Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index, is a measure of the size of firms in relation to the industry and an indicator of the degree of competition among 
them. Usually, a HHI index below 100 indicates a highly competitive market, 100-1500 indicates an unconcentrated market, 
1500-2500 indicates amoderate concentration, and 2500+ indicates high concentration) in the US (924.3). There are many 
domestic producers rising and falling over the last decade, while international brands still dominate the premium demand [8]. 
More and more international dairy brands are expanding their investment towards China to seize the market share. A first mover 
advantage is already realised by some incumbent brands such as Mead Johnson. Once the market is split by these mature 
international brands (most likely within the next five years), it will be very difficult for any new brand to squeeze in or for any 
incumbent brand to increase its market share. Therefore, a pre-emption strategy of increasing production capacity and magnifying 
marketing campaign is suggested.
The policy change in the background section also entails upgrading the technology in milk powder production. There is a time 
lag in establishing the new factory (usually one to two years), and the ones start early will take the first mover’s advantage in milk 
powder market. This project analysis needs forward looking beyond financial analysis [9].
Cost Decomposition
Cost decomposition of YILI’s milk powder product lines shows that material is the dominating component of the costs. Once 
the factory is built, the additional costs for maintaining the machine and facilities are less than 5% of the total costs. The structure 
seems to be quite stable over years (Table 6).
Table 6. Cost decomposition of YILI’s milk powder.
Year 2012 2011
Total Costs 2,713,287,626.97 % 3,239,060,279.48 %
Material 2,532,525,698.57 93.34% 3,038,195,307.71 93.80%
Labour 55,982,428.14 2.06% 63,552,610.64 1.96%
Manufacturing 124,779,500.26 4.60% 137,312,361.13 4.24%
CONCLUSION
Although this report is based on a case study of a typical dairy company, the two financial indicators can be used to inform 
the decision making on investing in a new milk powder factory. In particular, the high profit margin suggests a high capacity of 
milk powder market and supports such an investment. However, the decision maker needs to compare its overall returns with the 
project returns to draw a conclusion on whether and how to increase the investment on new factory. 
Moreover, if original financial reports of the subsidiary companies are not available, there is no way to track down the detailed 
costs of building the factory, such as the costs of blending, canning line and spry tower. The cost of land is usually negotiated 
with the local government (sometimes it could be free). These bring about uncertainty in costs, and hence in the profitability and 
in returns. Appropriate project management and human resources need to be arranged to implement the project. Despite the 
uncertainty, building new factories for technology in milk powder new production is the inevitable trend in the near future.
Given the evidence from the leading domestic and international producers, the decision maker is strongly suggested to check 
and compare the financial indicators for the milk powder products with the overall averages. Moreover, the timing of investment 
and capital formation require the decision maker to look forward—it is the anticipated demand and price that determine the future 
profit margins and returns.
As a bird’s view of the whole decision making on the project, there are three other pieces of information should be collected 
in addition to the two case studies here. Firstly, at the corporate level, the detailed financial reports of the decision maker’s 
company should be used to calculate and compare the financial indicators between projects, in order to inform the decision. 
Secondly, at the market level, forecasts on the future demand and supply should be conducted to estimate future profitability and 
returns of both milk powder products and other alternatives. Last but not least, policy analysis and strategic considerations should 
also be systematically discussed to fit the project decision to the long run corporate plan.
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